The Terms of Agreement by John Heritage and Geoffrey Raymond (2005)
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Social Psychology
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The Terms of Agreement: Indexing Epistemic Authority and Subordination in
Talk-in-Interaction
John Heritage and Geoffrey Raymond Social Psychology Quarterly 2005 68: 15 DOI: 10.1177/019027250506800103 The online version of this article can be found at: http://spq.sagepub.com/content/68/1/15 |
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#2032—Social Psychology Quarterly—VOL. 68 NO. 1—68103-heritage
Social Psychology Quarterly
2005, Vol. 68, No. 1, 15–38
The Terms of Agreement: Indexing Epistemic Authority and Subordination in Talk-in-Interaction*
JOHN HERITAGE
University of California, Los Angeles
GEOFFREY RAYMOND
University of California, Santa Barbara
Within the general framework of agreement on a state of affairs, the matter of the terms of agreement can remain: determining whose view is the more significant or more authoritative with respect to the matter at hand. In this paper we focus on this issue as it is played out in assessment sequences. We examine four practices through which a sec- ond speaker can index the independence of an agreeing assessment from that of a first speaker, and in this way can qualify the agreement. We argue that these practices reduce the responsiveness of the second assessment to the first; in this way they resist any claim to epistemic authority that may be indexed by the first speaker in “going first” in assess- ing some state of affairs.
2005, Vol. 68, No. 1, 15–38
The Terms of Agreement: Indexing Epistemic Authority and Subordination in Talk-in-Interaction*
JOHN HERITAGE
University of California, Los Angeles
GEOFFREY RAYMOND
University of California, Santa Barbara
Within the general framework of agreement on a state of affairs, the matter of the terms of agreement can remain: determining whose view is the more significant or more authoritative with respect to the matter at hand. In this paper we focus on this issue as it is played out in assessment sequences. We examine four practices through which a sec- ond speaker can index the independence of an agreeing assessment from that of a first speaker, and in this way can qualify the agreement. We argue that these practices reduce the responsiveness of the second assessment to the first; in this way they resist any claim to epistemic authority that may be indexed by the first speaker in “going first” in assess- ing some state of affairs.
Social psychologists have long noted that
social actions involve persons in commit-
ments that others should recognize and vali-
date. Perhaps the preeminent theorist of this
perspective was Erving Goffman, who
observed in “On Face-Work,”
[W]hen a person volunteers a statement or message, however trivial or commonplace, he commits himself and those he addresses, and in a sense places everyone present in jeop- ardy. By saying something, the speaker opens himself up to the possibility that the intended recipients will affront him by not listening or will think him forward, foolish, or offensive in what he has said (1967:37).
And in Relations in Public,
[L]et a participant whom others would rather see silent make a statement, and he will have expressed the belief that he has a full right to talk and is worth listening to, thereby obliging his listeners to give a sign, however begrudg- ing and however mean, that he is qualified to speak (1971:95).
Goffman conceptualized these obliga- tions in the concept of “face,” which he con- ceived as central to the organization of social
* We thank Emanuel Schegloff and the Social Psychology Quarterly reviewers for comments on ear- lier drafts. This paper was developed jointly from orig- inal materials contributed independently by each author.
[W]hen a person volunteers a statement or message, however trivial or commonplace, he commits himself and those he addresses, and in a sense places everyone present in jeop- ardy. By saying something, the speaker opens himself up to the possibility that the intended recipients will affront him by not listening or will think him forward, foolish, or offensive in what he has said (1967:37).
And in Relations in Public,
[L]et a participant whom others would rather see silent make a statement, and he will have expressed the belief that he has a full right to talk and is worth listening to, thereby obliging his listeners to give a sign, however begrudg- ing and however mean, that he is qualified to speak (1971:95).
Goffman conceptualized these obliga- tions in the concept of “face,” which he con- ceived as central to the organization of social
* We thank Emanuel Schegloff and the Social Psychology Quarterly reviewers for comments on ear- lier drafts. This paper was developed jointly from orig- inal materials contributed independently by each author.
interaction. This work was extended by
Brown and Levinson (1987); drawing on
Durkheim’s (1915) distinction between nega-
tive and positive rites, they distinguished
between negative face (the desire to be unim-
peded) and positive face (the desire for
approval, appreciation, or ratification).1
Brown and Levinson operationalized face-
work into a set of specifically linguistic strate-
gies that embody connections between
language use, social distance, power, and
related variables. In this way, connections are
made between face processes embodied in
interaction and facets of social and cultural
identity; both Goffman’s theory and Brown
and Levinson’s extension are at pains to dis-
tinguish these notions. Identity is specific and
local to persons, groups, and cultures, where-
as the desire to be unimpeded and to be
regarded positively—the two central compo-
nents of face—embody putatively universal
elements of human conduct and are con-
ceived as basic to its organization.
Goffman’s theoretical conception of face as situated within “the flow of events in the encounter” (1967:7) invited an empirical focus on sequences of talk-in-interaction; these, as Schegloff (1992) observes, are a pri- mordial site of human sociality. One domain
1 These notions, of course, have a long lineage in Western political and social thought; see Berlin (2002:166–217).
15
Goffman’s theoretical conception of face as situated within “the flow of events in the encounter” (1967:7) invited an empirical focus on sequences of talk-in-interaction; these, as Schegloff (1992) observes, are a pri- mordial site of human sociality. One domain
1 These notions, of course, have a long lineage in Western political and social thought; see Berlin (2002:166–217).
15
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16 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
of such research, generally recognized as con-
verging with Goffman’s concerns, is the man-
agement of conversational actions, such as
agreement and disagreement, that are clearly
consequential for social solidarity.
Conversation analysts have used the term
preference organization to refer to the set of
practices through which persons manage
courses of action that either promote or
undermine social solidarity (Holtgraves 1992;
Lerner 1996; Pomerantz 1978; 1984; Sacks
1987; Schegloff 1988, forthcoming; Schegloff,
Jefferson, and Sacks 1977). The most promi-
nent organizational consequence of these
practices is to maximize the likelihood of affil-
iative, socially solidary actions, and to mini-
mize the consequences of disaffiliative,
socially divisive ones (Heritage
1984a:265–80).
In addition to the organization of prefer- ence, however, participants’ concerns with face can be found in the management of rights and responsibilities related to knowledge and information. For example, conversationalists treat one another as possessing privileged access to their own experiences and as having specific rights to narrate them (Pomerantz 1980; Sacks 1984); journalists distinguish between firsthand and derivative access to breaking news as relevant for the rights to describe it (Raymond 2000; Roth 2002); callers to 911 emergency services report matters in quite distinctive terms if they are bystanders to an incident rather than victims (Whalen and Zimmerman 1990); and patients offer medical diagnoses to physicians only under relatively particular circumstances (Gill 1998; Gill and Maynard forthcoming; Heritage and Robinson forthcoming). In each of these cases, the distribution of rights and responsibilities regarding what participants can accountably know, how they know it, whether they have rights to describe it, and in what terms is directly implicated in organized practices of speaking.2
In this paper we consider sequences in which participants offer evaluative assess- ments of states of affairs. We focus on how rel- ative rights to perform these evaluations are indexed within the talk. Although these sequences are occupied mainly with agree-
2 Also see Drew (1991); Drew and Heritage (1992).
In addition to the organization of prefer- ence, however, participants’ concerns with face can be found in the management of rights and responsibilities related to knowledge and information. For example, conversationalists treat one another as possessing privileged access to their own experiences and as having specific rights to narrate them (Pomerantz 1980; Sacks 1984); journalists distinguish between firsthand and derivative access to breaking news as relevant for the rights to describe it (Raymond 2000; Roth 2002); callers to 911 emergency services report matters in quite distinctive terms if they are bystanders to an incident rather than victims (Whalen and Zimmerman 1990); and patients offer medical diagnoses to physicians only under relatively particular circumstances (Gill 1998; Gill and Maynard forthcoming; Heritage and Robinson forthcoming). In each of these cases, the distribution of rights and responsibilities regarding what participants can accountably know, how they know it, whether they have rights to describe it, and in what terms is directly implicated in organized practices of speaking.2
In this paper we consider sequences in which participants offer evaluative assess- ments of states of affairs. We focus on how rel- ative rights to perform these evaluations are indexed within the talk. Although these sequences are occupied mainly with agree-
2 Also see Drew (1991); Drew and Heritage (1992).
ment and are fundamentally affiliative, we
show that they can involve complex face con-
siderations relating to the management of
knowledge and information. We distinguish
between assessments that initiate an assess-
ment sequence as “first position assessments,”
and assessments that are designed to be
responsive to these as “second position assess-
ments.”3
In sequences of interaction, first position assessments establish a representational field in which second assessments will be found to position themselves in some fashion: through agreement, disagreement, or adjustment (Heritage 2002a; Pomerantz 1984). In this sense, first position assessments offer a terrain within which agreement will be sought. We propose that these assessments also carry an implied claim that the speaker has primary rights to evaluate the matter assessed. For example, as we demonstrate, persons offering first assessments may work to defeat any implication that they are claiming primary rights to evaluate the matter at hand. Conversely, persons who find themselves pro- ducing a responsive assessment may wish to defeat the implication that their rights in the matter are secondary to those of a first speak- er. Because assessments are always produced in real time and are unavoidably produced as first and second positioned actions, they bring unavoidable relevance to issues concerning relative epistemic rights to evaluate states of affairs.
Our primary objective is to explicate the management of these rights, and the means by which this management is achieved. To do so, we focus on the intersection between differen- tial rights to make assessments, turn design, and sequential positioning. As we demon- strate here, persons in the midst of jointly eval-
3 First position assessments commonly emerge in environments that have been made “ripe” for them in various ways. For example, another speaker has made observations which clearly imply a particular evalua- tive stance towards the entity under discussion and which may trigger the production of an assessment. First positioned assessments are distinctive in that they take an explicit, on-record evaluative stance that is available to be agreed with or disagreed with in next turn. First positioned assessments do not “agree” or “disagree” with the previous comments that lead up to them, though they may be aligned or disaligned with the tenor of those comments.
In sequences of interaction, first position assessments establish a representational field in which second assessments will be found to position themselves in some fashion: through agreement, disagreement, or adjustment (Heritage 2002a; Pomerantz 1984). In this sense, first position assessments offer a terrain within which agreement will be sought. We propose that these assessments also carry an implied claim that the speaker has primary rights to evaluate the matter assessed. For example, as we demonstrate, persons offering first assessments may work to defeat any implication that they are claiming primary rights to evaluate the matter at hand. Conversely, persons who find themselves pro- ducing a responsive assessment may wish to defeat the implication that their rights in the matter are secondary to those of a first speak- er. Because assessments are always produced in real time and are unavoidably produced as first and second positioned actions, they bring unavoidable relevance to issues concerning relative epistemic rights to evaluate states of affairs.
Our primary objective is to explicate the management of these rights, and the means by which this management is achieved. To do so, we focus on the intersection between differen- tial rights to make assessments, turn design, and sequential positioning. As we demon- strate here, persons in the midst of jointly eval-
3 First position assessments commonly emerge in environments that have been made “ripe” for them in various ways. For example, another speaker has made observations which clearly imply a particular evalua- tive stance towards the entity under discussion and which may trigger the production of an assessment. First positioned assessments are distinctive in that they take an explicit, on-record evaluative stance that is available to be agreed with or disagreed with in next turn. First positioned assessments do not “agree” or “disagree” with the previous comments that lead up to them, though they may be aligned or disaligned with the tenor of those comments.
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EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY AND SUBORDINATION 17
uating states of affairs are concerned not only
with agreement, but also with who is agreeing
with whom (Schegloff 1996a:177)—or, as we
shall have it, “the terms of agreement.”
ASSESSMENTS AND THEIR EPISTEMICS
The assessment of states of affairs gener-
(1) [NB:IV:10:2]
3 Emm:
ASSESSMENTS AND THEIR EPISTEMICS
The assessment of states of affairs gener-
(1) [NB:IV:10:2]
3 Emm:
ally requires some form of access to the state
of affairs being assessed (Pomerantz 1984). In
(1), for example, a second speaker struggles
to find a basis for affiliating with a first
assessment whose very construction (“you
sh’d see that house E(h)mma”) denies the
access necessary for building agreement:
[h h]Jeeziz Chris’ you sh’d see that house E(h)mma yih’av 2 ↓no idea.h[hmhh
[h h]Jeeziz Chris’ you sh’d see that house E(h)mma yih’av 2 ↓no idea.h[hmhh
1 Lot:
[I bet it’s a drea:m.
Emma’s response in line 3 (“I bet it’s a
drea:m.”) projects an agreement with
Lottie’s assessment of the house, while
simultaneously thematizing her lack of first-
hand experience. Lacking that experience,
she manages raw affiliation with Lottie’s
evaluation by an utterance that expresses, at
best, a simulacrum of agreement.
(2) [JS:II:28]
(2) [JS:II:28]
While (1) illustrates the limits of verbal-
ized agreement without access, most assess-
ment sequences incorporate the
presumption of concurrent or serial joint
access to a referent state of affairs. Such
access can be first-order and immediate, as
in (2):
-
1 J: -> T’s tsuh beautiful day out isn’t it? -
2 L: -> Yeh it’s jus’ gorgeous...
(3) [JS:II:61]
1 Jon:
2 Eve:
1 Jon:
2 Eve:
-
3 Lyn:
-
4 Eve:
We saw Midnight Cowboy yesterday- or [suh- Friday.
[Oh?
Didju s- you saw that, [it’s really good.
[No I haven’t seen it
-> Jo saw it ‘n she said she f- depressed her
6 Eve: -> ter[ribly
-
7 Jon: -> [Oh it’s [terribly depressing. -
8 Lyn: -> [Oh it’s depressing.
As these two examples indicate, access to
assessable objects is ranked. First-order access
entails rights to assess, which can outweigh the
rights of second-order access. In (2) the initial
assessment of the weather is marked by its pre-
sent-tense declarative form as drawn from
direct and current experience; in this context of
face-to-face interaction, such experience is
equally available to the recipient. The co-inter-
actant responds with an agreement (“Yeh”)
and an upgraded second assessment with com-
parable features. In (3), by contrast, Eve’s
assessment of Midnight Cowboy at lines 5–6 is
marked as based in the account of a third party.
Jon and Lyn’s responsive assessments, howev-
er, renew the claim to direct, first-order access
to the movie (first asserted in line 1), and are
marked by the “oh”-prefaces as asserting
stronger rights to assess it (Heritage 2002a).
First and Second Position Assessments and Rights to Assess
Participants orient to first and second
First and Second Position Assessments and Rights to Assess
Participants orient to first and second
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18 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
position as involved in claims about rights to
make assessments. This is most apparent in
cases where there is some incompatibility
between the epistemic rights that a speaker
wishes to claim and the position in which the
assessment is offered. In (4), for example,
Norma offers a downgraded first assessment
of a third party:
(4) [SBL 2-1-8:5]
5 Nor:
-
1 Bea:
-
2 Nor:
-
3 Bea:
5 Nor:
hh hhh We:ll,h I wz gla:d she c’d come too las’ni:ght=
-> =Sh[e seems such a n]ice little [lady]
[(since you keh) ] [dAwf’l]ly nice l*i’l
p*ers’n. t hhhh hhh We:ll, I[: j’s]
Just before this sequence, it emerged that
Norma had met the person assessed in line
2—a longtime acquaintance of Bea—for the
first time (see Example (14) below). The
asymmetry in their experience is indexed in
Norma’s evidentially downgraded assess-
ment “She seems such a nice little lady” and
Bea’s declaratively asserted agreement
“dAwf’lly nice l*i’l p*ers’n.” By downgrading
her claimed access with the evidential verb
“seems” (Chafe and Nichols 1986),4 Norma
[I thin]k evryone enjoyed jus...
manages her initial assessment so as to defeat
any epistemic priority that might have been
inferred sheerly from its first positioning.
The reverse contingency is evident in (5) below. Here Abe and Ben are in the midst of a discussion prompted by Abe’s announce- ment that he has acquired a Burmese cat. As emerged earlier in the conversation, Ben’s knowledge of Burmese cats is second-order: it is derived from a neighbor’s ownership of the breed:
(5) [TCIIA:1]
1 Abe:
1 Abe:
It’s the- only cat I ever saw that chased do:gs.
(0.2)
[ehh hhu[hh huhh ]
[(Hadda)[go out’n r]escue a dog thet wz eight times bigger’n
he wz th’s [morning.
2
-
3 Ben:
-
4 Abe:
5
6 Ben:
7 Abe: e-huh-huh-[heh-[heh-he:h,]
[e- .hhhhhh Hurra::y fer the Burme:se.
8 Ben:
9
10 Abe:
11
[F:::[ight’n fo]o:ls.
(0.2)
Pard’n,
(0.3)
12 Ben: -> .hhh They’re fight’n fools those Burmese,
13 Abe: -> Oh I know ‘e is.
The target sequence of assessments
(lines 12–13) emerges from Ben’s effort
(lines 6 and 8) to affiliate with Abe’s illustra-
tion of his cat’s fighting prowess. His clearly
responsive “Hurra::y fer the Burme:se.” is
appreciated with laughter, while his append-
ed characterization of Burmese cats as
4 Evidentially qualified claims (using expressions such as “It looks, feels, appears X”) are downgraded relative to unmarked declarative claims because they are compatible with the asserted state of affairs not being the case. Thus it is possible to offer the remark “She seems (looks, sounds) X, but she isn’t” without self-contradiction.
4 Evidentially qualified claims (using expressions such as “It looks, feels, appears X”) are downgraded relative to unmarked declarative claims because they are compatible with the asserted state of affairs not being the case. Thus it is possible to offer the remark “She seems (looks, sounds) X, but she isn’t” without self-contradiction.
“F:::ight’n foo:ls.” is treated as problematic
with ”Pard’n,”.5 As a result, Ben’s original
phrasal assessment, which initially was pro-
duced in second position to Abe’s first posi-
tioned assessment (and therefore fitted to
Ben’s rights to assess Burmese cats), comes
to be produced as a fully sentential declara-
tive assessment “.hhh They’re fight’n fools
those Burmese,” (line 12). In this context,
Abe comes to treat Ben as asserting rights to
assess Burmese cats that are equivalent to his
5 For an account of this kind of “open class” repair initiation, see Drew (1997).
5 For an account of this kind of “open class” repair initiation, see Drew (1997).
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EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY AND SUBORDINATION 19
own, and it is this putative claim of equiva-
lence that Abe resists. Three features of
Abe’s turn embody this resistance. First, he
shifts the terms of assessment from Ben’s
assessment of the breed in general (“those
Burmese”), to the cat which he owns and has
primary rights to assess. Second, the “oh”-
prefaced design of this assessment indexes
his claim to primary rights in this matter
(Heritage 2002a). Finally his use of, and stress
on, the word know underscores his claims in
this regard.
As the talk in these sequences demon- strates, participants work to manage the rela- tionship between rights to assess and sequential position by manipulating the design of the turns out of which their assess- ments are built. In the following sections we examine speakers’ resources for managing this intersection of rights to assess and sequential position.
(6) [VIYMC 1:4]
As the talk in these sequences demon- strates, participants work to manage the rela- tionship between rights to assess and sequential position by manipulating the design of the turns out of which their assess- ments are built. In the following sections we examine speakers’ resources for managing this intersection of rights to assess and sequential position.
(6) [VIYMC 1:4]
Assessments in First Position: Resources for
Indexing Epistemic Rights
Speakers can design first positioned assessments to create three basic forms that modulate the extent of their claimed epis- temic rights. Using these resources, producers of first positioned assessments may manage face claims by asserting the socioepistemic rights associated with particular social identi- ties, or by deferring to the rights associated with the identities of others.
Unmarked first assessments. In unmarked assessments, speakers deploy simple declara- tive evaluations that claim unmediated access to the assessable. These utterances contain no language that either strengthens or weakens the declarative claim that is made. For exam- ple, in excerpts (6) and (7), speakers assess their immediate experience.
Speakers can design first positioned assessments to create three basic forms that modulate the extent of their claimed epis- temic rights. Using these resources, producers of first positioned assessments may manage face claims by asserting the socioepistemic rights associated with particular social identi- ties, or by deferring to the rights associated with the identities of others.
Unmarked first assessments. In unmarked assessments, speakers deploy simple declara- tive evaluations that claim unmediated access to the assessable. These utterances contain no language that either strengthens or weakens the declarative claim that is made. For exam- ple, in excerpts (6) and (7), speakers assess their immediate experience.
-
1 J: Let’s feel the water. Oh, it... -
2 R: -> It’s wonderful. It’s just right. It’s like bathtub water.
1 Emm: =We’re painting like ma:d in th’kitchen=
2 -> =a:nd oh evrything’s workin out so pretty here
In (8) the first speaker deploys similar were shared with the coparticipant:
resources to evaluate past experiences which
(8) [SBL 2-2-3:5]
-
1 Chl: -> We:ll it was [fu:n Clai[re, ((smile voice)) -
2 Cla: [ hhh [Yea::[:h,]
3 Chl:
A similar pattern is evident in (9), where the assessment concerns a joint acquaintance:
(9) [NB:IV.7:-44]
A similar pattern is evident in (9), where the assessment concerns a joint acquaintance:
(9) [NB:IV.7:-44]
1 A: -> Adeline’s such a swell [gal
[°M]m°
2 P:
Across these sequences, the first speak- ers’ declarative utterances (arrowed) flatly assert evaluations of states of affairs, and clearly do so on the basis of direct access to them.
Downgraded first assessments.
Contrasting with these are assessments designed to exhibit downgraded epistemic access to a state of affairs. Two main
Across these sequences, the first speak- ers’ declarative utterances (arrowed) flatly assert evaluations of states of affairs, and clearly do so on the basis of direct access to them.
Downgraded first assessments.
Contrasting with these are assessments designed to exhibit downgraded epistemic access to a state of affairs. Two main
[Oh God, whadda gal. You know it!
resources can be used to accomplish this.
First are evidentials (also see (4) above),
through which speakers mark mediated
access to a referent, and thus downgrade the
claims made by the accompanying assess-
ment. In (10), for example, Hyla has been
describing a play that she and Nancy have
tickets to see:
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20 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
(10) [HG II:6]
(10) [HG II:6]
1 Nan: -> Kinyih tell me what it’s abou:t?=
2
3
4
5 Hyl:
6
7
8 Nan:
9 Hyl:
10
11 Nan: ->
12 Hyl:
13
14
.....[27 lines of description deleted]
=.hh En she’s fixed up, (0.4) en she meets this gu:y, .hh a:n’
yihknow en he’s (.) rilly gorgeous’n eez rilly nice en
evrythi[:ng bud li]ke=
[Uh h u :h,]
=.hh He’s ah .hh Hollywood (0.3) s:sta:r’s son yihknow who wz
a mista:[ke en they [put im in’n [Academy,]
[Oo this [sounds[sogoo::]_::[d?[school, .hh buh
wai:t.=’n then, .hhm (0.2) .tch en the:(w)- the mother’s .hh
sister is a real bigot.
It is clear from line 1 that Hyla is the bet-
ter informed about the play. This asymmetry
is preserved in Nancy’s assessment (“Oo this
sounds so goo::::d?”) at line 11; the evidential
formulation of this underscores that the basis
for her evaluation is premised on the infor-
mation provided in Hyla’s description.
A second means to downgrade an assess- ment involves the use of tag questions. By introducing an invitation to agree with the
(11) [Rah 14: 2]
A second means to downgrade an assess- ment involves the use of tag questions. By introducing an invitation to agree with the
(11) [Rah 14: 2]
assessment as a feature of its surface syntax,
such questions index a putatively secondary
access to a referent relative to the copartici-
pant.6 In (11), for example, the assessment
refers to Vera’s grandchildren, whose recent
visit included a stopover at Jenny’s house.
Jenny’s declaratively formulated assessment
is modulated with a tag question that defers
to Vera’s rights to assess her own family
members:
1 Jen: Mm [I: bet they proud o:f the fam’ly.=
2 Ver: [Ye:s.
3 Jen: -> =They’re [a luvly family now ar’n’t [they.
4 Ver:
5 Jen:
6 Ver:
7 Jen:
[°Mm:.°
[They are: ye[s.
[eeYe[s::,
[Yes,
Mm: All they need now is a little girl tih complete i:t.
The tag question is positioned so as to
invite response as the first matter to be
addressed by the coparticipant. In this way,
Jenny formulates her turn as (in the first
instance) a question to be answered rather
than as an assertion to be agreed with; thus
she cedes epistemic authority in the matter to
her coparticipant. The introduction of the
invitation to agreement in the surface design
6 A number of authors, including Bernstein (1971), Kollock, Blumstein and Schwartz (1985), Lakoff (1975), and O’Barr and Atkins (1980), have linked the use of tag questions to class, gender, and power. In this
6 A number of authors, including Bernstein (1971), Kollock, Blumstein and Schwartz (1985), Lakoff (1975), and O’Barr and Atkins (1980), have linked the use of tag questions to class, gender, and power. In this
of the utterance indexes Jenny’s position that
Vera has primary rights to assess her own
grandchildren.
In a similar case, Norman and Ilene are dog breeders discussing the breeding poten- tial of one of Norman’s younger dogs. At line 9, Ilene invokes a comparison with Trixie, another of Norman’s dogs.
section we connect their use not to general social identities but to the acknowledgment of particular, situated rights to evaluate specific states of affairs. Such rights may or may not map onto more general differences in social power.
In a similar case, Norman and Ilene are dog breeders discussing the breeding poten- tial of one of Norman’s younger dogs. At line 9, Ilene invokes a comparison with Trixie, another of Norman’s dogs.
section we connect their use not to general social identities but to the acknowledgment of particular, situated rights to evaluate specific states of affairs. Such rights may or may not map onto more general differences in social power.
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EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY AND SUBORDINATION 21
(12) [Heritage 1:11:4]
(12) [Heritage 1:11:4]
1 Ile: No well she’s still a bit young though isn’t [she<ah me]an:=
2 Nor:
3 Ile: =uh[:
[S h e : :]
-
4 Nor:
-
5 Ile:
-
8 Nor:
-
9 Ile: ->
10 Nor: ->
11 Ile:
[She wz a year: la:st wee:k.
Ah yes. 0h well any time no:w [then.]
=But she[:’s (
)]
[Uh:::]:[m
[Ye:s.=
[Cuz Trixie started] so early [didn’t sh[e,
[°O h : : [ye:s.°=
=°Ye:h°=
Ilene’s assessment asserts that the dog
started breeding “early” and the following
tag acknowledges Norman’s primary rights
to assess his own dog.7
Upgraded first assessments. Just as assess-
Upgraded first assessments. Just as assess-
ments can be epistemically downgraded rela-
tive to a recipient’s attributedly superior
rights, so can they be upgraded. The primary
resource for this task is the negative interrog-
ative, as in (13):
(13) [SBL:2-1-8:5]
1 Bea:
2
1 Bea:
2
-
3 Nor:
-
4 Bea:
-
5 Nor:
-
6 Bea: ->
Wz las’night th’firs’time you met Missiz Kelly?
(1.0)
Me:t who:m?
Missiz Kelly?
^Ye:s. hh[Yih kno]:w what<]
[ Isn’t ]she a cu]te little thi:ng?
Here it is established at the beginning of
the sequence that Bea has a more extended
acquaintance with “Missiz Kelly” than does
Norma (lines 1–5). Bea asserts her corollary
epistemic rights in her assessment at line 6. The
form of her assessment embodies this stance
7 In (11) and (12), the first speaker uses epistemic downgrading to address the coparticipant’s clear pri- mary rights to assess the referent. In a sub-set of cases, however, similar downgrading does not appear
[JS:II:41)
7 In (11) and (12), the first speaker uses epistemic downgrading to address the coparticipant’s clear pri- mary rights to assess the referent. In a sub-set of cases, however, similar downgrading does not appear
[JS:II:41)
through the following features working in con-
cert:
First, by virtue of its interrogative syntax, this format mandates a second assessment through the conditional relevance of a ques- tion-answer pair more strongly than would a simple declarative. Moreover, by projecting a
to address such a contingency. These cases involve copresent parties assessing a commonly available state of affairs:
In these three cases, it is evident that neither party
First, by virtue of its interrogative syntax, this format mandates a second assessment through the conditional relevance of a ques- tion-answer pair more strongly than would a simple declarative. Moreover, by projecting a
to address such a contingency. These cases involve copresent parties assessing a commonly available state of affairs:
In these three cases, it is evident that neither party
J: -> T’s- tsuh beautiful day out isn’t it?
L: Yeh it’s jus’ gorgeous ...
[VIYMC:1:2] ((J and R are in a rowboat on a lake))
J: -> It’s really a clear lake, isn’t it?
R: It’s wonderful.
[Ravioli Dinner:6 (Mark and Kim are eating dinner involving many samples of free food]
Mar: Not bad for free huh?
(0.3)
Kim: Hm mm.
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22 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
yes/no (or type-conforming) response, it asserts
command of the terms to be used by the recipi-
ent in the assessment of the referent (Raymond
2003). Finally, the negative interrogative strong-
ly invites agreement (Heritage 2002b). It there-
by invokes an established or settled position
and, through that, a more extensive acquain-
tance with the referent and/or stronger rights to
assess it.
All three of these features cooperate to establish Bea’s evaluative position as “settled” or “decided” and, as part of that position, to
All three of these features cooperate to establish Bea’s evaluative position as “settled” or “decided” and, as part of that position, to
reinforce her primary rights to assess the
acquaintance in question.
In a second case, (14) below, Emma is call- ing to thank Margie for a recent lunch party. She extends a compliment about the occasion into a sustained and favorable evaluation of the others present. This culminates, like (13), in a positive assessment managed through a nega- tive interrogative. Emma’s assessment “e-that Pa:t isn’she a do::ll?” emerges as an Nth com- pliment to her co-interactant:
In a second case, (14) below, Emma is call- ing to thank Margie for a recent lunch party. She extends a compliment about the occasion into a sustained and favorable evaluation of the others present. This culminates, like (13), in a positive assessment managed through a nega- tive interrogative. Emma’s assessment “e-that Pa:t isn’she a do::ll?” emerges as an Nth com- pliment to her co-interactant:
(14) [NB VII:1-2]
1 Emm:
2
3 Mar:
1 Emm:
2
3 Mar:
-
4 Mar:
-
5 Emm:
-
6 Mar:
-
7 Emm: ->
-
8 Mar:
=Oh honey that was a lovely luncheon I shoulda ca:lled you
s:soo[:ner but I:]l:[lo:ved it.Ih wz just deli:ghtfu[: l.]=
[((f)) Oh:::] [°( ) [Well]=
=I wz gla[d y o u] (came).]
[’nd yer f:] friends] ‘r so da:rli:ng,=
= Oh:::[: it wz:]
[e-that P]a:t isn’she a do:[:ll?]
Here, perhaps in an effort to emphasize
the compliment, Emma deploys a format that
asserts her own epistemic primacy in relation
to “Pat,” the assessed party, although she
acknowledges her recipient’s closer relation-
ship with her. In contrast to the previous case,
then, we find a lack of fit between this claim
and the actual state of the relations between
the parties. This turns out to be a source of
subsequent difficulty (see the discussion of
(27) below).
In sum, although first assessments index a tacit claim to epistemic primacy, that claim can be modified: practices exist for asserting both upgraded and downgraded epistemic access and/or rights to assess a referent. It is clear that these practices embody selectional choices, given that an unmarked method of
can claim epistemic primacy concerning the referent states of affairs. Given the concurrent, direct, and therefore equal access enjoyed by both participants, the first speaker’s use of a tag question can be under- stood to downgrade the putatively primary rights to assess the referent that might attach to having gone first. This downgrading is accomplished by inviting agreement in the surface design of the turn through the [declarative + tag question] format.
In sum, although first assessments index a tacit claim to epistemic primacy, that claim can be modified: practices exist for asserting both upgraded and downgraded epistemic access and/or rights to assess a referent. It is clear that these practices embody selectional choices, given that an unmarked method of
can claim epistemic primacy concerning the referent states of affairs. Given the concurrent, direct, and therefore equal access enjoyed by both participants, the first speaker’s use of a tag question can be under- stood to downgrade the putatively primary rights to assess the referent that might attach to having gone first. This downgrading is accomplished by inviting agreement in the surface design of the turn through the [declarative + tag question] format.
[iYe]h
assessment (i.e., the use of an unqualified declarative statement), which embodies an unmarked claim of primacy, is also an avail- able option.
Managing Epistemic Rights in Second Position Assessments
Just as first position assessments can incorporate features that index relative access to a referent, so too do second position assessments. The task of indexing relative access is complicated for second speakers by the fact that their access must be managed in relation to the claims embodied in first posi- tion assessments, and indeed to the specific practices deployed by first speakers to index those claims.
Second position assessments can take a simple declarative form, as in (15) and (16). Here the participants are jointly assessing shared social occasions. In each case these assessments conclude an extended passage of conversation about the events that are refer- enced, during which joint access to the events has been thoroughly established as a feature of the talk.
assessment (i.e., the use of an unqualified declarative statement), which embodies an unmarked claim of primacy, is also an avail- able option.
Managing Epistemic Rights in Second Position Assessments
Just as first position assessments can incorporate features that index relative access to a referent, so too do second position assessments. The task of indexing relative access is complicated for second speakers by the fact that their access must be managed in relation to the claims embodied in first posi- tion assessments, and indeed to the specific practices deployed by first speakers to index those claims.
Second position assessments can take a simple declarative form, as in (15) and (16). Here the participants are jointly assessing shared social occasions. In each case these assessments conclude an extended passage of conversation about the events that are refer- enced, during which joint access to the events has been thoroughly established as a feature of the talk.
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(15) [SBL 2-2-3:5]
1 Chl:
1 Chl:
EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY AND SUBORDINATION 23
We:ll it was [fu:n Clai[re, ((smile voice))
[ hhh [Yea::[:h,]
[°M]m°
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2 Cla:
3 Chl:
4 Chl: [(an’)
5 Cla: -> [I enjoyed evreh minute o[f it,
6 Chl:
(16) [SBL:2-1-8:5]
1 Nor:
(16) [SBL:2-1-8:5]
1 Nor:
2
3 Bea: ->
4
5 Nor:
6
[Yah.
I think evryone enjoyed jus’ sitting aroun’
ta::lk[ing.]
[ h h] I do too::,
(0.3)
Yihknow e-I think it’s too bad we don’t do that once’n
awhile insteada playing bri:dge er ‘hh
As these examples suggest, given equal
access to past events, a declarative assess-
ment in first position invites a matching
response claiming similar access.
Alternatively, second speakers can mod- ulate their response to upgrade their claimed epistemic access to, and/or rights to assess, a referent. Two main kinds of resources are deployed to this end. First, speakers can design the second assessment so as to convey that their position on the matter is already “settled”—that is, held independently of the view that the first speaker’s assessment con- veys. In this way they can undercut any rela- tive inferiority in epistemic rights that sheer “secondness” might otherwise convey; indeed, they can advance a claim to primary epistemic rights in the matter under evalua- tion. Second, speakers can use interrogative syntax in second position to undercut, and supplant, the “firstness” of a first assessment, and to seize the epistemic rights that accrue to that position. These resources are deployed, and their deployment is under- stood, in relation to the claims that are indexed in first position assessments.
Upgrading with resources that assert a position as “previously held.” We discuss two
(2) [JS:II:28]
Alternatively, second speakers can mod- ulate their response to upgrade their claimed epistemic access to, and/or rights to assess, a referent. Two main kinds of resources are deployed to this end. First, speakers can design the second assessment so as to convey that their position on the matter is already “settled”—that is, held independently of the view that the first speaker’s assessment con- veys. In this way they can undercut any rela- tive inferiority in epistemic rights that sheer “secondness” might otherwise convey; indeed, they can advance a claim to primary epistemic rights in the matter under evalua- tion. Second, speakers can use interrogative syntax in second position to undercut, and supplant, the “firstness” of a first assessment, and to seize the epistemic rights that accrue to that position. These resources are deployed, and their deployment is under- stood, in relation to the claims that are indexed in first position assessments.
Upgrading with resources that assert a position as “previously held.” We discuss two
(2) [JS:II:28]
resources with which speakers in second
position can present an evaluation as previ-
ously held or “settled.” Using these
resources, producers of second positioned
assessments may assert the socioepistemic
rights associated with particular social identi-
ties: they may “match” the claims of down-
graded first position assessments or,
alternatively, may compete with epistemic
priorities that may be suggested by
unmarked first position assessments.
Upgrading with confirmation + agree- ment token: The first resource to be discussed exploits features of tag questions in down- graded first position assessments. Because a tag question (like other yes/no-type ques- tions) makes a “yes” or a “no” relevant as the first component of a response (Raymond 2003), speakers can produce different actions by designing their responses to satisfy or defeat this expectation. For example, in the following excerpt (discussed above as excerpt (2)), the first speaker uses a tag ques- tion to downgrade a declaratively produced assessment of the weather, thereby indexing the similar rights available to a copresent participant.
Upgrading with confirmation + agree- ment token: The first resource to be discussed exploits features of tag questions in down- graded first position assessments. Because a tag question (like other yes/no-type ques- tions) makes a “yes” or a “no” relevant as the first component of a response (Raymond 2003), speakers can produce different actions by designing their responses to satisfy or defeat this expectation. For example, in the following excerpt (discussed above as excerpt (2)), the first speaker uses a tag ques- tion to downgrade a declaratively produced assessment of the weather, thereby indexing the similar rights available to a copresent participant.
-
1 J: -> T’s tsuh beautiful day out isn’t it? -
2 L: -> Yeh it’s jus’ gorgeous...
In response, L agrees with J’s assessment
while similarly declining to assert primary
rights in the matter. By initiating her turn
with “Yeh”, L satisfies the constraints set by
J’s tag question and thereby accepts the
terms set by J’s first position assessment
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(17) [Holt 1.1:8]
1 Mum:
1 Mum:
Miriam’s going next week,
Ye:s: yes:.
(0.4)
She[’s been in hot water with’er Mum t’day,
[M-
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24 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
(Raymond 2003). In this respect, L’s respon-
sive assessment is wholly occupied with
agreement.
Alternatively, speakers can upgrade their claimed access to a referent using a [confir- mation + agreement token] turn format. In the following excerpt, for example, Mum describes a child in “hot water” because of a
Alternatively, speakers can upgrade their claimed access to a referent using a [confir- mation + agreement token] turn format. In the following excerpt, for example, Mum describes a child in “hot water” because of a
“craze” for wearing two earrings in a single
ear (lines 4–9). While the turn-initial “oh” of
Lesley’s response (line 10) indexes recogni-
tion of the “craze” to which Mum’s answer to
Lesley’s question refers (Heritage 1984b), its
tag question downgrades her asserted rights
to assess the fashion that has landed Miriam
in “hot water”:
2 Les:
3
4 Mum:
5 Les:
6 Les: Why::?
.hh We:ll. (0.2) Uh you know (.) there’s a cra:ze with the
girls now to have (.) a secon:d. (1.1) ring ih- a secon:d
uh earring in on[e ear.
7 Mum:
8
9
10 Les:
11 Mum: -> It’s very cheap yes’n this is u- this is what Ann said. An’
-
12 Ann said (0.3) she- she’ll haf (.) tuh have another. (0.5) -
13 .hh (.) hole in’er ear...((continues story))
[Oh: it’s very chea:p isn’it.
Mum’s response takes the form of a full
repeat (“It’s very cheap”) followed by a type
conforming token (“Yes”). This response
complements Lesley’s stance by indexing her
own primary rights as storyteller, which ini-
tially were projected by Lesley’s epistemical-
ly downgraded turn. Two features of Mum’s
assessment work to accomplish this comple-
mentarity.
First, Lesley’s epistemically downgrading tag is a “yes/no” question: like other ques- tions of this type, it invites a “type-conform- ing” “Yes” or “No” response as the first component of any response (Raymond 2003). In this context, Mum’s deferral of the “Yes” is constructed as a marked action. The placement of the agreement token (“Yes”) after the partial repeat separates the action of agreeing from the action of “confirming” in a way that the normal ordering of responses to the question (“Yes it is”) does not. Whereas “Yes it is” would be understood as wholly occupied with agreement, Mum’s actual response (“It’s very cheap yes”), with its ini- tial declaratively formed partial repeat, con- firms Lesley’s evaluation rather than simply agreeing with it. By “confirming the asser- tion” before “responding to the question,” Mum also treats agreement with Lesley’s
First, Lesley’s epistemically downgrading tag is a “yes/no” question: like other ques- tions of this type, it invites a “type-conform- ing” “Yes” or “No” response as the first component of any response (Raymond 2003). In this context, Mum’s deferral of the “Yes” is constructed as a marked action. The placement of the agreement token (“Yes”) after the partial repeat separates the action of agreeing from the action of “confirming” in a way that the normal ordering of responses to the question (“Yes it is”) does not. Whereas “Yes it is” would be understood as wholly occupied with agreement, Mum’s actual response (“It’s very cheap yes”), with its ini- tial declaratively formed partial repeat, con- firms Lesley’s evaluation rather than simply agreeing with it. By “confirming the asser- tion” before “responding to the question,” Mum also treats agreement with Lesley’s
assessment as a matter of lower priority. Thus
she goes out of her way to subordinate the
action of agreeing with the assessment to the
assertion of her epistemic rights relative to
Lesley’s. Finally, Mum’s ordering of the [par-
tial repeat] and [agreement token] conveys
the position that Lesley’s evaluation address-
es a matter on which Mum already holds a
“settled” opinion which is quite independent
of this occasion (Raymond 2003). In this
instance, that she held this position previous-
ly is also asserted overtly by reference to
what “Ann” (Miriam’s mother) previously
said to her (lines 11–13).
Second, if the first component of Mum’s turn is designed to assert the independence and priority of her position in relation to Lesley’s, the second component modulates any hint of impropriety that might be glossed from that treatment, legitimizing Lesley’s evaluation and bringing the two women’s positions into alignment. This is accom- plished by the production of a type-conform- ing token; this token, in satisfying the constraints set by Lesley’s tag question, ulti- mately accepts the terms set by Lesley’s first position assessment (Raymond 2003).
In this example, to assert priority the sec- ond speaker draws on the tag question in the
Second, if the first component of Mum’s turn is designed to assert the independence and priority of her position in relation to Lesley’s, the second component modulates any hint of impropriety that might be glossed from that treatment, legitimizing Lesley’s evaluation and bringing the two women’s positions into alignment. This is accom- plished by the production of a type-conform- ing token; this token, in satisfying the constraints set by Lesley’s tag question, ulti- mately accepts the terms set by Lesley’s first position assessment (Raymond 2003).
In this example, to assert priority the sec- ond speaker draws on the tag question in the
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EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY AND SUBORDINATION 25
prior speaker’s turn. In this way she matches
the prior speaker’s indication of downgraded
access/rights to evaluate with her own
upgraded claims in the matter. This comple-
mentarity is present in a large majority of
first positioned [assessment + tag question]
formatted utterances in our data.8
In (18), the same speakers are discussing Lesley’s daughter’s dental problems. At line 3, the grandmother (Mum) asks if the prob- lem is related to “eye teeth,” using a format
(18) Holt X(C)-1-2-7 (p4, 14)
In (18), the same speakers are discussing Lesley’s daughter’s dental problems. At line 3, the grandmother (Mum) asks if the prob- lem is related to “eye teeth,” using a format
(18) Holt X(C)-1-2-7 (p4, 14)
that prefers an affirmative response. Lesley’s
response is complex: it refers to the child’s
dentist as the authority for a negative
response, while stating her intention to send
the child to her own dentist for a second
opinion (line 8). Mum’s renewal of her earli-
er diagnostic suggestion (line 9), produced in
this context of skepticism, reinvokes her ear-
lier question-formed diagnosis while upgrad-
ing its likelihood by using a [statement + tag
question] format.
1 Les:
.hh An’ I’ll: get her fixed up with a de:ntist too:,
(0.7)
Oh w’t a ↓nuisance isn’t ↓it. Is it ↓ey:e tee:th?
(0.4).hh ↑Well the den: u-her dentist says °no:t.° (0.2)
2
3 Mum:
4
5 Les:
6
7 Mum: [↑Hm:.
3 Mum:
4
5 Les:
6
7 Mum: [↑Hm:.
8 Les:
9 Mum:
10
11 Les: ->
[.hh But I:’ll send ‘er to ↓my den:tist I thi[nk
[Sounds
↓like it ↑d’z’n’t[↓it.
[.hhh It does rather yes:
↓like it ↑d’z’n’t[↓it.
[.hhh It does rather yes:
Here Lesley is the one with more direct
access to the daughter’s medical problems; as
her mother, she has primary rights to evalu-
ate them. The downgraded rights to assess
indexed by Mum’s [statement + tag question]
are matched by Lesley’s epistemically
upgraded [partial repeat + agreement]
response.
Upgrading via confirmation can be
accomplished by means other than partial
repeats. Excerpt (19) involves a further case,
in which the neighbor (Jenny: also see
Example (11)) assesses a member of Vera’s
family (her son Bill) in first position. As in
the prior sequences, Jenny’s subordinate
rights are indexed in a [statement + tag ques-
tion] formatted assessment:
(19) [Rah 14:6]
1
Ver:
=Jillian, she c’n be a little nasty little bi[tch.
[Well you w’r
say:↑ing thez something in that_=It’s a sha:me i[sn’t i:t.]
[Yeh a::n]d-
even Jean said she couldn’t do eh uh she said she’s alw’z
glad when they go:.
Yeh .h well of course you see Bill is so good wih th’m ez
well is[n’t h[e:.
[.kl [That’s ri:ght yes.
2
3
4 Ver:
5 Ver:
6
7 Jen:
8
9 Ver: ->
Jen:
8 The data used in this paper comprise several hun-
dred items of ordinary conversation drawn from
Britain and the United States. Most, but not all, of our
cases involving symmetry between [assessment + tag
question] and [partial repeat + agreement] forms are
drawn from British data. What Schegloff (personal
communication) calls “the British tag” as a means to
downgrade epistemic claims may be much more
prominent among speakers of British English than
among their U.S. counterparts. For another case of
British/U.S. divergence in basic interactional usage,
see Jefferson (2002).
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26 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
Similar to the repeats deployed in the
prior excerpts, Vera’s “That’s right” response
treats “confirmation” as the primary business
of the response, before going on to agree-
ment with “Yes.” In addition, the formulation
“That’s right” more overtly takes an epistem-
ically authoritative stance in relation to
Jenny than do the earlier partial repeats.
In these examples, speakers achieve epis- temic alignment by downgrading rights to assess in first position assessments and upgrading them in second position. The [con- firmation + agreement] format is most com- monly used in response to interrogatively formed assessments, particularly those deploying tag questions. This distribution can be understood as a product of the specific set of resources that tag questions make avail- able and relevant. An assessment with a tag question appended offers the recipient an opportunity to disentangle confirmation and agreement as distinct activities in a respond- ing turn. Speakers can simply agree (e.g., “Yes” or “Yes, they are”). Alternatively, by
(20) [Heritage 1:11:4]
In these examples, speakers achieve epis- temic alignment by downgrading rights to assess in first position assessments and upgrading them in second position. The [con- firmation + agreement] format is most com- monly used in response to interrogatively formed assessments, particularly those deploying tag questions. This distribution can be understood as a product of the specific set of resources that tag questions make avail- able and relevant. An assessment with a tag question appended offers the recipient an opportunity to disentangle confirmation and agreement as distinct activities in a respond- ing turn. Speakers can simply agree (e.g., “Yes” or “Yes, they are”). Alternatively, by
(20) [Heritage 1:11:4]
inverting the order of a confirmation and an
agreement token, speakers can treat answer-
ing and agreement as separable activities and
can exploit their separation to assert their
epistemic supremacy.
Upgrading with “oh”-prefaced second assessments: A second practice for epistemi- cally upgrading second assessments is “oh”- prefacing. In these cases, the change-of-state sense of “oh” (Heritage 1984b, 1998) is used to index epistemic independence and priori- ty, relative to a first assessment (Heritage 2002a). In contrast to the practice of confirm- ing in turn-initial position described above, which normally exploits an earlier tag ques- tion, “oh”-prefaced second assessments are much less constrained in the contexts of their occurrence.
In (20), as noted earlier, Norman is the owner of the dog “Trixie,” whom Ilene evalu- ates (line 9) as having “started so early.” This assessment is followed by a tag question which downgrades her epistemic access to this information relative to Norman’s
Upgrading with “oh”-prefaced second assessments: A second practice for epistemi- cally upgrading second assessments is “oh”- prefacing. In these cases, the change-of-state sense of “oh” (Heritage 1984b, 1998) is used to index epistemic independence and priori- ty, relative to a first assessment (Heritage 2002a). In contrast to the practice of confirm- ing in turn-initial position described above, which normally exploits an earlier tag ques- tion, “oh”-prefaced second assessments are much less constrained in the contexts of their occurrence.
In (20), as noted earlier, Norman is the owner of the dog “Trixie,” whom Ilene evalu- ates (line 9) as having “started so early.” This assessment is followed by a tag question which downgrades her epistemic access to this information relative to Norman’s
1 Ile: No well she’s still a bit young though isn’t [she<ah me]an:=
2 Nor:
3 Ile: =uh[:
[S h e : :]
-
4 Nor:
-
5 Ile:
-
8 Nor:
-
9 Ile: ->
10 Nor: ->
11 Ile:
[She wz a year: la:st wee:k.
Ah yes. 0h well any time no:w [then.]
[Uh:::]:[m
[Ye:s.=
=But she[:’s (
[Cuz Trixie started] so early [didn’t sh[e,
)]
occasioned a review, recollection, and renew- al of the speaker’s previous experience and judgment, and that this forms the basis for the second assessment (Heritage 2002a). As with [confirmation + agreement], “oh”-pref- acing functions to convey superior knowl- edge of, and/or rights to assess, the matter under discussion.
The following case (21) vividly illus- trates this usage. Gay is giving Jeremy a German telephone number. After she has recited 11 digits, thus exceeding the norm (during the 1980s) for a (British) intra- country call, Jeremy comments (line 13) on the length of the number, prefacing his
occasioned a review, recollection, and renew- al of the speaker’s previous experience and judgment, and that this forms the basis for the second assessment (Heritage 2002a). As with [confirmation + agreement], “oh”-pref- acing functions to convey superior knowl- edge of, and/or rights to assess, the matter under discussion.
The following case (21) vividly illus- trates this usage. Gay is giving Jeremy a German telephone number. After she has recited 11 digits, thus exceeding the norm (during the 1980s) for a (British) intra- country call, Jeremy comments (line 13) on the length of the number, prefacing his
[°O h : : [ye:s.°=
=°Ye:h°=
Simultaneous with the tag question,
Norman’s “Oh:: ye:s.” asserts epistemic prior-
ity on the issue. “Oh”-prefacing here conveys
a “change of state of orientation” in response
to Ilene’s assessment. This is a systematic way
of claiming that a speaker has independent
access to, and already holds a position
regarding, the referent. “Oh”-prefacing is
thus a resource through which a second
speaker can convey that the assessment
which follows is independent of the “here
and now” of current experience and the prior
speaker’s evaluation. It achieves this out-
come through a “change of state semantics,”
which conveys that the first assessment has
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EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY AND SUBORDINATION 27
comment with “Gosh.” This expression
indicates that, for him, this is something
new, notable, or surprising. Here Gay could
have responded with a simple agreement,
which, as in (15) and (16) above, would
have conveyed that her agreement was
grounded in the “here and now” common
experience of an interminable telephone
number. Instead Gay begins her response
with “Oh it doe:s”:
(21) [Heritage:0I:7:3]
1
Gay:
So the ↑number is (0.2) oh: one oh::.
Oh one oh:,
(1.0)
(1.0)
2
3
4 Jer: Yeup,
5 Gay: ↑Four ni:ne,
3
4 Jer: Yeup,
5 Gay: ↑Four ni:ne,
Jer:
6
7 Jer: Ri:ght?
(0.5)
8 Gay:
9
10 Jer:
11
12 Gay:
13 Jer: -> °Gosh°it goe:s (.) goes on’n on
14 Gay: -> Oh it doe:s Germany doe:s.
Sev’n three,u-six o:ne?hh
(0.6)
Sev’n three: six o:ne?
(0.3)
Ei:ght ni:ne,
Two aspects of Gay’s “Oh it doe:s” treat
Jeremy’s remark as reviving an earlier obser-
vation of the same type that she had made
independently of this occasion. Thereby they
convey that Gay, in contrast to Jeremy, finds
the length of the number unsurprising. First,
as noted earlier, the “oh”-preface indexes
prior and independent access to this phe-
nomenon. Second, the partial repeat (“it
does”), by confirming rather than simply
agreeing with Jeremy’s remark, underscores
this stance (Stivers forthcoming). By these
means Gay also manages to indicate that she
is an “old hand” at phoning abroad. In addi-
tion, Gay continues with a turn component
that appears to be designed to further suggest
her expertise about foreign telephone calls.
Her postpositioned “adjusting” component
(“Germany doe:s.”) recalibrates the referent
of her response from this particular tele-
phone number to German telephone num-
bers in general, and also conveys a degree of
prior knowledge on the topic. Moreover, with
(22) [NB IV.10.R:1]
(22) [NB IV.10.R:1]
-
1 Emm:
-
2 Lot:
-
3 Emm: ->
-
4 Lot: -> Oh:: Jeeziz ih wz go:rgeous::. -
5 Emm: Wh’t a ni:ce ↑wut time’djih git i:n. Jst a li’l whal ago?
its hint of a further contrast with telephone
numbers in other foreign countries, it implies
a still broader expertise in placing telephone
calls abroad. Shortly afterwards, Gay under-
scores her expertise, informing Jeremy that
the “ringing” sound on a German phone
sounds like a “busy” signal on a British phone
(data not shown).
A third case points to the use of “oh”- prefacing as a means of countering a recipi- ent’s upgraded claim of access to a referent that began as the speaker’s informational preserve. By inquiring into Lottie’s trip (to Palm Springs), Emma casts her as having direct and immediate experiential access to its events that Emma herself lacks. Emma, however, meets Lottie’s enthusiastic initial assessment of the trip (‘Oh:: Go:d wonderful Emma,” ) with an “oh”-prefaced, negative interrogative “Oh idn’it beautiful do:wn the:re,” which embodies a competitive claim to primacy in assessing the attractions of the location.
A third case points to the use of “oh”- prefacing as a means of countering a recipi- ent’s upgraded claim of access to a referent that began as the speaker’s informational preserve. By inquiring into Lottie’s trip (to Palm Springs), Emma casts her as having direct and immediate experiential access to its events that Emma herself lacks. Emma, however, meets Lottie’s enthusiastic initial assessment of the trip (‘Oh:: Go:d wonderful Emma,” ) with an “oh”-prefaced, negative interrogative “Oh idn’it beautiful do:wn the:re,” which embodies a competitive claim to primacy in assessing the attractions of the location.
.h ↑How wz yer tri:p.
Oh:: Go:d wonderful Emm[a,
[Oh idn’it beautiful do:wn the:re,
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28 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
Lottie herself then responds to this assess-
ment with a further and equally competitive
“oh”-prefaced agreement that underscores
her own claims to primacy in the matter. This
competitiveness is also evident in the referent
shifting that is part of the sequence. The
sequence begins with Lottie’s evaluation of
her recent trip; Emma’s assessment at line 3
shifts the referent to its general locale, a
knowledge domain to which Emma has some
claim. In turn, Lottie’s response at line 4 uses
the past tense (“wz”) to shift the referent of
her assessment back to her own arena of
expertise—the recently completed trip.
In sum, “oh”-prefacing can be deployed in a wide variety of contexts by a second or (as in (22)) subsequent assessor to assert epistemic independence and supremacy rela- tive to a first. In addition to competing with sheer “firstness” (as in (20) and (21)), it can also be deployed (as in (22)) to meet and compete with epistemically upgraded prior assessments.
Upgrading by usurping the “firstness” of a previous assessment. Using two resources— tag questions and negative interrogatives— speakers who are responding to an assessment in second position can assert their assessment as a “first positioned” evaluation. In both cases, interrogative syntax is deployed as a means of usurping a previous speaker’s first positioned assessment with a new one that now commands the terms of agreement. With these resources, speakers effectively usurp the socioepistemic claims of others.
Upgrading with tag questions: While tag- questions downgrade first position assess- ments, their function is reversed in second position: there they upgrade second position
In sum, “oh”-prefacing can be deployed in a wide variety of contexts by a second or (as in (22)) subsequent assessor to assert epistemic independence and supremacy rela- tive to a first. In addition to competing with sheer “firstness” (as in (20) and (21)), it can also be deployed (as in (22)) to meet and compete with epistemically upgraded prior assessments.
Upgrading by usurping the “firstness” of a previous assessment. Using two resources— tag questions and negative interrogatives— speakers who are responding to an assessment in second position can assert their assessment as a “first positioned” evaluation. In both cases, interrogative syntax is deployed as a means of usurping a previous speaker’s first positioned assessment with a new one that now commands the terms of agreement. With these resources, speakers effectively usurp the socioepistemic claims of others.
Upgrading with tag questions: While tag- questions downgrade first position assess- ments, their function is reversed in second position: there they upgrade second position
assessments.9 In second position, the [assess-
ment + tag] format invites agreement to the
position that is taken by the second speaker,
thus preempting “first position” in the
sequence. In this way it upgrades the second
speaker’s claimed rights over the first with
respect to the matter at hand. This usage is
illustrated clearly in (23). In this sequence,
Jenny and Vera are discussing Vera’s two
grandsons after a recent visit to Vera, during
which the children also visited Jenny’s home.
After some discussion of the children, Jenny
and Vera face a potential discrepancy regard-
ing what they have just agreed on (in lines
4–6) when each names a different child to
complete Jenny’s observation “he’s a bright
little boy.” Almost as soon as this discrepancy
becomes apparent, (that is, when Vera, the
grandmother, produces “Paul” in overlap
with Jenny’s “little James,” lines 5 and 6),
Jenny immediately accepts “Paul” by repeat-
ing his name (line 5) and then offering sever-
al agreement tokens (in lines 5/7). Perhaps to
counter the potential inference that she was
simply “going along” with Vera in accepting
“Paul” as the “bright” boy, Jenny offers a neg-
ative assessment of James: “Yeh James’s a lit-
tle devil” (line 11). By initiating her turn with
“Yeh”, Jenny builds it as a continuation of
the prior sequence, effectively offering the
assessment as confirmation that she “meant”
Paul in the first place because she already
viewed James as “a little devil.” Ironically, in
solving this problem, Jenny inadvertently
creates trouble of a different kind: in convey-
ing that she meant to refer to Paul, Jenny
comes to produce a declaratively formed,
first position, negative assessment of Vera’s
other grandson, James.
(23) [Rahman:14:1-2]
1
Ver:
ehr: they readjer comics:’n evrythink yihkn[o:w
[Yeh: w’l
I think he’s a bri:ght little boy: u[h:m
[I: do=
=l[ittle Ja]:[:mes,] uh [Pau:l.yes.]
[ Pau:l, ] [mm- m] mm [Pau : : l,]
Jen:
2
3
4 Ver:
5 Jen:
6 Ver:
7 Jen: Mm:.[Yes.
8 Ver: [Yes.
9 The fact that tag questions function differently in example of what Schegloff (1996b) calls “positionally
first and second positions in a sequence is a clear sensitive grammar.”
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EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY AND SUBORDINATION 29
9 (0.3)
10Ver: [Yes( )]
9 (0.3)
10Ver: [Yes( )]
[.huh .hh[h He:-
[James is a little bugger [isn’e.
11 Jen:
12 Ver:
13 Jen:
14 Ver: ->
15 Jen:
[Yeh-
-> [Yeh James’s a little] divil ihhh ↑heh heh
[That-
16 Jen:
Yeah [(into) ev’rythi]ng.
Although she steps in to agree with
Jenny’s assessment, Vera as the grandmother
resists the putatively superior access entailed
in such a first position assessment.
This resistance is embodied most force- fully in Vera’s use of a tag question in turn- final position. By deploying an interrogative form as part of a second position assessment, Vera marks her turn as a “new” first pair part. The “firstness” of her assessment is also man- ifest in her re-use of “James” (a locally initial reference form deployed in a locally subse- quent position (Schegloff 1996c). Moreover, the remainder of her turn is designed as a full-form declarative that effectively disre- gards Jenny’s immediately prior reference to him, and, by extension, her utterance. The sta- tus of Vera’s utterance as a “first position” assessment is subsequently accepted by Jenny: she cuts off her initial response to Vera’s comment (line 15), and then redoes her responsive agreement at line 16 with a type-conforming “Yeah” and an elaboration
This resistance is embodied most force- fully in Vera’s use of a tag question in turn- final position. By deploying an interrogative form as part of a second position assessment, Vera marks her turn as a “new” first pair part. The “firstness” of her assessment is also man- ifest in her re-use of “James” (a locally initial reference form deployed in a locally subse- quent position (Schegloff 1996c). Moreover, the remainder of her turn is designed as a full-form declarative that effectively disre- gards Jenny’s immediately prior reference to him, and, by extension, her utterance. The sta- tus of Vera’s utterance as a “first position” assessment is subsequently accepted by Jenny: she cuts off her initial response to Vera’s comment (line 15), and then redoes her responsive agreement at line 16 with a type-conforming “Yeah” and an elaboration
that gives a potential (and decidedly pallid)
specification of the “little bugger” as “into
everything.” In this case, then, the tag ques-
tion, by inviting a response, positions Vera’s
evaluation as a first action to be agreed or
disagreed with. In this way, it attenuates its
responsiveness to Jenny’s initial evaluation,
thus asserting Vera’s rights in the matter.
Upgrading with negative interrogatives: Just as negative interrogatives upgrade the epistemic claims embodied in first assess- ments, they also can achieve this outcome for second assessments. Used in second position, negative interrogatives (like second posi- tioned tags) provide a putatively “new” first pair part for the previous speaker to respond to, and thus attenuate their status as “second position” assessments. In the following case (discussed above), Margie’s second assess- ment downgrades the virtues of the assessed party (“Pat”) while deploying a negative interrogative to assert upgraded rights to her opinion.
Upgrading with negative interrogatives: Just as negative interrogatives upgrade the epistemic claims embodied in first assess- ments, they also can achieve this outcome for second assessments. Used in second position, negative interrogatives (like second posi- tioned tags) provide a putatively “new” first pair part for the previous speaker to respond to, and thus attenuate their status as “second position” assessments. In the following case (discussed above), Margie’s second assess- ment downgrades the virtues of the assessed party (“Pat”) while deploying a negative interrogative to assert upgraded rights to her opinion.
(24) [NBVII:1-2]
1 Emm:
2
3 Mar:
1 Emm:
2
3 Mar:
-
4 Mar:
-
5 Emm:
-
6 Mar:
-
7 Emm:
-
8 Mar: ->
=Oh honey that was a lovely luncheon I shoulda ca:lled you
s:soo[:ner but I:]l:[lo:ved it.Ih wz just deli:ghtfu[: l.]=
[((f)) Oh:::] [°( ) [Well]=
=I wz gla[d y o u] (came).]
[’nd yer f:] friends] ‘r so da:rli:ng,=
= Oh:::[: it wz:]
[e-that P]a:t isn’she a do:[:ll?]
As we noted earlier, Emma praises
Margie’s friend (“Pat”) using a negative inter-
rogative (line 7) to upgrade both her rights to
assess the friend and, with it, the compliment
that her assessment embodies. Perhaps to
manage the receipt of this compliment in an
appropriately downgraded fashion
(Pomerantz 1978), Margie responds (line 8)
[iY e]h isn’t she pretty,
with an initial type-conforming agreement
and a significantly weaker token of praise
(“pretty” versus Emma’s “a doll”) (Pomerantz
1984). At the same time, she asserts her own
primacy in assessing her friend by packaging
her response as a negative interrogative.
A somewhat more perverse case can be found in a return to excerpt (22):
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30
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
.h ↑How wz yer tri:p. Oh:: Go:d wonderful Emm[a,
.h ↑How wz yer tri:p. Oh:: Go:d wonderful Emm[a,
(22) [NB IV.10.R:1]
-
1 Emm:
-
2 Lot:
-
3 Emm: ->
[Oh idn’it beautiful do:wn the:re,
relative rights to assess, and therefore is rela-
tively “mild.” Much more combative are the
“all-purpose” resources afforded by the use
of “oh”-prefacing, tag questions, and negative
interrogatives. Whether a first assessment is
unmarked, upgraded, or downgraded, the
change-of-state semantics of “oh”-prefacing
asserts an independent stance, and hence
epistemic authority, in relation to an assess-
able. It can be used in combination with other
resources, and can be deployed to address
first assessments regardless of their specific
formulation.Tagquestionsinsecondposition
function by asserting interactional primacy in
assessment sequences: their deployment of
interrogative syntax formulates the second
speaker’s assessment as the axial one calling
for agreement. Finally, negative interroga-
tives are perhaps the strongest of the four
practices. Like tag questions, they deploy
interrogative syntax to assert interactional
primacy in an assessment sequence, but they
are significantly more assertive. Thus they
combine both the import of a declarative and
the sequential implicativeness of an interrog-
ative as resources to wrest the initiative from
the first speaker.
Multiplex Deployments of These Resources and the Management of Face
Having developed an analysis of some of the resources through which speakers negoti- ate epistemic primacy and subordination in assessment sequences, we now turn to three cases in which the terms of agreement are more complicated. In the preceding analysis we relied on examples involving a straight- forward relationship between the partici- pants’ prima facie socioepistemic rights and the practices they deploy to manage them as a way of establishing a relationship between the two. There is no guarantee, however, that speakers will assert the rights to which they may be entitled, nor that recipients will align with or support the rights asserted by them. Speakers may assert rights that are (or could be) contested; in some cases they may defer
#2032—Social Psychology Quarterly—VOL. 68 NO. 1—68103-heritage
As we noted above, Lottie is the project-
edly authoritative evaluator of her trip. Her
initial evaluation, however, is intersected
with an “oh”-prefaced negative interroga-
tively formed assessment. By shifting the ref-
erent to the location, this assessment brings
the topical focus of the sequence towards
Emma’s generalized experience of Palm
Springs rather than Lottie’s more immediate
experiences there. In these ways, an assess-
ment initiated in response to Lottie’s evalua-
tion is designed to exert control over the
onward trajectory of the sequence.
Summary
Above we described four practices with which speakers can upgrade the epistemic claims of second assessments relative to the claims embodied in first positioned assess- ments. These four practices are of two types. The first two—[repeat/confirmation + agree- ment] and [”oh”-prefacing]—assert primary rights to assess by embodying the claim that the position asserted was held already and independently by the second speaker. The second two—[statement + tag] and [negative interrogatives]—assert primary rights by manipulating the sequence to “reclaim” the first position assessment slot and thereby the epistemic rights which accrue to that posi- tion. These two latter practices reflect an important way in which “first” and “second” position, though at first appearance lodged in the temporal order, are not confined there. Rather, these positions can be negotiated through practices of speaking that reflexively claim “first position” and “second position” (see note 10) as distinct from the raw appear- ances of temporal ordering in the flow of conversation.
Reviewing these practices, the first— [confirmation + agreement]—is relatively specialized to environments in which first assessments are downgraded by using tag questions. For these reasons, this practice is normally used in circumstances where the speakers achieve alignment concerning their
Summary
Above we described four practices with which speakers can upgrade the epistemic claims of second assessments relative to the claims embodied in first positioned assess- ments. These four practices are of two types. The first two—[repeat/confirmation + agree- ment] and [”oh”-prefacing]—assert primary rights to assess by embodying the claim that the position asserted was held already and independently by the second speaker. The second two—[statement + tag] and [negative interrogatives]—assert primary rights by manipulating the sequence to “reclaim” the first position assessment slot and thereby the epistemic rights which accrue to that posi- tion. These two latter practices reflect an important way in which “first” and “second” position, though at first appearance lodged in the temporal order, are not confined there. Rather, these positions can be negotiated through practices of speaking that reflexively claim “first position” and “second position” (see note 10) as distinct from the raw appear- ances of temporal ordering in the flow of conversation.
Reviewing these practices, the first— [confirmation + agreement]—is relatively specialized to environments in which first assessments are downgraded by using tag questions. For these reasons, this practice is normally used in circumstances where the speakers achieve alignment concerning their
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EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY AND SUBORDINATION 31
to a recipient with putatively subordinate
rights. Here we consider three cases in which
participants assert rights which are potential-
ly problematic, or which become a source of
conflict or struggle. By explicating the
resources through which such circumstances
are prosecuted, we can discern the reflexive
character of these practices for asserting rela-
tive rights to assess in sequences of turns, and
thus the management of face and identity
issues within these interactions.
The first of our cases involves one party’s assertion of the primary right to assess a per- son that previously had been treated as her recipient’s primary right to assess. In (25), Vera and Jenny are discussing Vera’s grand- children after a recent visit. As we noted above, in the course of managing a potential discrepancy regarding what Jenny and Vera have just agreed on (in lines 4–6), Jenny
The first of our cases involves one party’s assertion of the primary right to assess a per- son that previously had been treated as her recipient’s primary right to assess. In (25), Vera and Jenny are discussing Vera’s grand- children after a recent visit. As we noted above, in the course of managing a potential discrepancy regarding what Jenny and Vera have just agreed on (in lines 4–6), Jenny
comes to offer a negative assessment of one
grandson, James (line 11), most likely to
counter the inference that she was simply
deferring to Vera’s naming of Paul as the
“bright little boy.” Although Vera produces a
similarly negative assessment of James (line
14), she then complicates matters by revers-
ing herself and evaluating James’s behavior
positively (line 17–18). It is this reversal, and
Jenny’s response to it, that we now address.
This environment may be especially prob-
lematic for Jenny: if she is to agree with Vera,
she must produce a positive, second position
assessment of James even though she has just
offered a highly negative assessment. As in
the sequence regarding Paul, Jenny has a
clear interest in indicating that her reversal is
not “merely responsive” to Vera’s, especially
since she has lesser rights to evaluate the
child.
(25) [Rahman:14:1-2]
1 Ver:
1 Ver:
ehr: they readjer comics:’n evrythink yihkn[o:w
[Yeh: w’l
I think he’s a bri:ght little boy: u[h:m
[I: do=
=l[ittle Ja]:[:mes,] uh [Pau:l.yes.]
[ Pau:l, ] [mm- m] mm [Pau : : l,]
2 Jen:
3
4 Ver:
5 Jen:
6 Ver:
7 Jen: Mm:.[Yes.
8 Ver:
9
10Ver:
11 Jen:
12 Ver:
13 Jen:
14 Ver:
15 Jen:
16 Jen:
17 Ver: -> 18
9
10Ver:
11 Jen:
12 Ver:
13 Jen:
14 Ver:
15 Jen:
16 Jen:
17 Ver: -> 18
[Yes.
(0.3)
[Yes( )]
[Yeh James’s a little] divil ihhh ↑heh heh [That-
[.huh .hh[h He:-
Oo ‘e wz beautiful here [wuz↑n’t’ee.=
[↓Yes. =’E wz very well beha:ved.
[Yes( )]
[Yeh James’s a little] divil ihhh ↑heh heh [That-
[.huh .hh[h He:-
[James is a little bugger [isn’e.
[Yeh-
Yeah [(into) ev’rythi]ng.
[Mindju ‘eez good] Jenny, ‘e wz mischeevious
but w-’e wz good.Oo ‘e wz beautiful here [wuz↑n’t’ee.=
[↓Yes. =’E wz very well beha:ved.
19 Jen:
20 Ver:
21 Jen:
->
Despite her putatively subordinate rights
in the matter, Jenny (line 19) strongly asserts
rights to assess James by (1) producing an
“oh”-prefaced assessment of James’s behav-
ior (2) focused on his behavior at her house.
She follows this assessment with (3) a tag
question. Each component of Jenny’s assess-
ment works against the potential inference
that her positive assessment reflected any-
thing other than the actual position she held
independently of Vera’s immediately prior
positive assessment. First, the “oh”-preface
indexes Jenny’s previous, independent access
to James. Second, Jenny supplies the basis for
this claim by invoking James’s behavior
“here” (at her own house), in contrast with
Vera’s assessment of his behavior in general.
Finally, her use of the tag question casts her
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(26) [Holt X(c)-1-1-1]
1 Les:
1 Les:
And um (0.4) I ↑don’ t know ↑ ‘f you remember Missiz
Mil↓beck th’t use to go to ↓chu:rch.
(0.8)
(0.8)
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32 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
turn as a “new” first assessment, even though
its production immediately follows Vera’s
positive evaluation of James.
In light of Jenny’s systematic deference, up to this point, to Vera’s primary rights to assess her own grandchildren, it appears that Jenny’s assertion of primary rights in this sequence is designed to defeat any suspicion that her current, positive assessment could be motivated simply by a desire to agree with Vera. Specifically, although her turn is pro- duced in response to Vera’s, she deploys an array of practices to establish that the posi- tion she takes in that turn is held indepen- dently of the circumstances of its production. In this case, then, Jenny uses such practices for asserting her primary rights to assess James (despite her previous deference to Vera) as a method for managing the local,
In light of Jenny’s systematic deference, up to this point, to Vera’s primary rights to assess her own grandchildren, it appears that Jenny’s assertion of primary rights in this sequence is designed to defeat any suspicion that her current, positive assessment could be motivated simply by a desire to agree with Vera. Specifically, although her turn is pro- duced in response to Vera’s, she deploys an array of practices to establish that the posi- tion she takes in that turn is held indepen- dently of the circumstances of its production. In this case, then, Jenny uses such practices for asserting her primary rights to assess James (despite her previous deference to Vera) as a method for managing the local,
interactional circumstances created by Vera’s
reversal.
Our second case offers a more ambigu- ous deployment of these resources. This excerpt is taken from a conversation between Lesley and her elderly mother, in which Lesley offers a series of reports regarding (potential) acquaintances who are currently in the hospital or who have just died. In this case, although Lesley produces an extended description of Mr. Millbeck, Mum fails to rec- ognize him. As Lesley proceeds with the report “anyway,” she notes that he was “still working” when he died at age 79. Yet despite Lesley’s status as teller and her clearly inti- mate access to the deceased, she packages her first position assessment (in line 25) using a tag question that eschews any claim of epis- temic primacy:
Our second case offers a more ambigu- ous deployment of these resources. This excerpt is taken from a conversation between Lesley and her elderly mother, in which Lesley offers a series of reports regarding (potential) acquaintances who are currently in the hospital or who have just died. In this case, although Lesley produces an extended description of Mr. Millbeck, Mum fails to rec- ognize him. As Lesley proceeds with the report “anyway,” she notes that he was “still working” when he died at age 79. Yet despite Lesley’s status as teller and her clearly inti- mate access to the deceased, she packages her first position assessment (in line 25) using a tag question that eschews any claim of epis- temic primacy:
2
3
4 Mum: °(Mi[ssiz)°
5 Les:
6
7 8Mum: 9 Les: 10
7 8Mum: 9 Les: 10
11 Mum:
12
13 Les:
14 Mum:
15 Les:
16
17
18 Mum:
19
20 Les:
21
22 Mum:
23 Les:
24 Mum:
-
25 Les:
-
26 Mum:
27
28 Mum:
29
30
31
[Uh: uh-he wz the vicar’s ward’n ↑anyway ↑he die:d
suddenly this week .hhh and he wz ↑still wo:r↓king.
(0.3)
([ )
[He wz ↑seventy ni↓:ne, (0.3)
My: wo:rd.
(0.2)
↑Y e : s [he: wz um
[(You’ve got s’m ↑rea:l) workers down the:re,heh He wz a p- uh: Ye:s. Indee:d .hh He wz a (0.2) .p a ↑buyer for the hoh- i-the ↑only horse hair fact’ry left in England.
Good (gracious).
(0.3)
And he wz their buyer,
(.)
↑Hm:::
.t
↑↑Hm:.
So ↑he
([ )
[He wz ↑seventy ni↓:ne, (0.3)
My: wo:rd.
(0.2)
↑Y e : s [he: wz um
[(You’ve got s’m ↑rea:l) workers down the:re,heh He wz a p- uh: Ye:s. Indee:d .hh He wz a (0.2) .p a ↑buyer for the hoh- i-the ↑only horse hair fact’ry left in England.
Good (gracious).
(0.3)
And he wz their buyer,
(.)
↑Hm:::
.t
↑↑Hm:.
So ↑he
->
->
had a good inni:ngs ↑did[n’t ↓he.
[I should say ↓so: ↑Ye:s.
[I should say ↓so: ↑Ye:s.
Les:
(0.2)
↑Marvelous.
(0.2)
.tk.hhhh ↑Anyway we had a very good evening ↑o:n Saturda:y
(0.2)
.tk.hhhh ↑Anyway we had a very good evening ↑o:n Saturda:y
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EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY AND SUBORDINATION 33
It is not clear whether Lesley’s tag ques-
tion indexes Mum’s rights to judge a person
of similar age, or simply acknowledges the
self-evident character of her assessment (i.e.,
that a person who worked until the day he
died at age 79 had a “good innings”). Mum,
however, matches the position taken by
Lesley by using the [confirmation] + [agree-
ment token] format to upgrade the rights that
otherwise would accrue to her second posi-
tion assessment. In this case, then, Lesley
manages the potentially problematic circum-
stance of producing a first position assess-
ment regarding a state of affairs that both she
and Mum can claim rights to assess by simply
avoiding any claim of epistemic priority,
despite her status as putatively the better-
informed party.
Finally, in our third case, competitive positions regarding epistemic rights to evalu- ate Margie’s friend are coopted into a deeply ambiguous process of agreement. This exam- ple, as noted previously, is an extended com- pliment sequence. After a generalized
Finally, in our third case, competitive positions regarding epistemic rights to evalu- ate Margie’s friend are coopted into a deeply ambiguous process of agreement. This exam- ple, as noted previously, is an extended com- pliment sequence. After a generalized
evaluation of Margie’s friends as “so
da:rli:ng” (line 5), Emma’s “e-that Pa:t
isn’she a do::ll?” singles out one of the guests
for particular praise. As observed earlier, the
primacy embodied in this first position
assessment is further upgraded by Emma’s
deployment of a negative interrogative for-
mat to package it. On the one hand, this for-
mat (as noted earlier) invites an agreement
produced as a response to a question. On the
other, however, the assessment and its format
create two problems for Margie. First, as a
question, the assessment invites confirma-
tion, but as a compliment Margie’s agree-
ment is constrained by conventions
governing self-praise (Pomerantz 1978).
Second, although Emma characterizes the
persons present as “your friends” (line 5)—
thus acknowledging Margie’s primary rights
to evaluate them—her assessment is pack-
aged with a format which (as we have seen)
asserts epistemic primacy and virtually com-
mands agreement.
(27) [NBVII:1-2]
1 Emm:
2
3 Mar:
1 Emm:
2
3 Mar:
-
4 Mar:
-
5 Emm:
-
6 Mar:
-
7 Emm:
-
8 Mar:
9
10 Emm:
11 Mar:
12 Emm:
=Oh honey that was a lovely luncheon I shoulda ca:lled you
s:soo[:ner but I:]l:[lo:ved it.Ih wz just deli:ghtfu[: l.]=
[((f)) Oh:::] [°( ) [Well]=
=I wz gla[d y o u] (came).]
[’nd yer f:] friends] ‘r so da:rli:ng,=
= Oh:::[: it wz:]
[e-that P]a:t isn’she a do:[:ll?]
[iY e]h isn’t she pretty,
(.)
Oh: she’s a beautiful girl.=
=Yeh I think she’s a pretty gir[l.
Margie’s response in this context embod-
ies two elements: (1) a minimal, pro forma,
type-conforming agreement “iYeh”, and (2) a
negative interrogative-formed assessment,
built as a new first assessment that invites
agreement but which is downgraded signifi-
cantly (“pretty” versus Emma’s “a doll”).
In the face of this divergent assessment, Emma’s response at line 10 reasserts a ver- sion of her earlier assessment (“beautiful girl”). It does so within an “oh”-prefacing frame that, in this context, reasserts an over-
In the face of this divergent assessment, Emma’s response at line 10 reasserts a ver- sion of her earlier assessment (“beautiful girl”). It does so within an “oh”-prefacing frame that, in this context, reasserts an over-
[En that Reinam’n::
riding epistemic claim. Here it is plausible to
see Emma’s insistence on this compliment as
an effort to overcome Margie’s purely
“social” resistance to it. Margie’s final
response again expresses a pro forma agree-
ment; however, her repetition of her earlier
evaluation (“pretty”) underscores her posi-
tion as overtly unmovable (as adumbrated in
her turn at line 8), while the introduction of
“I think” into the utterance explicitly
acknowledges its status as a disputed assess-
ment. Here, as in Example (25), one partici-
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34 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
pant’s efforts to build a strong positive evalu-
ation of a part of another person’s world cre-
ates a context in which agreement is
contaminated by a competitive epistemic
struggle.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In his essay “Territories of the Self,” Goffman describes an array of territorial “preserves” and ways in which their bound- aries “are ordinarily patrolled and defended by the claimant” (Goffman 1971:52). Goffman did not include a discussion of knowledge and expertise in his description of an “information preserve” (1971:63–64), though control over rights to information is evidently the object of linguistic and interac- tional management (Kamio 1997; Maynard and Zimmerman 1984) and systematic social competition (Abbott 1988). In this paper we have suggested that rights to evaluate states of affairs are indeed “ordinarily patrolled and defended” by individuals in routine con- versational practices through which these rights are ranked by speakers relative to one another.
Our evidence comprises two sorts of observations. First, we have argued that assessing a referent state of affairs in first position implies a claim of primary epistemic and/or moral rights to assess that state. We will abbreviate these as “K+ rights,” relative to those of a second speaker, who has lesser (“K–”) rights. The evidence for this claim is fourfold:
To begin with, first position assessments are rarely upgraded in the several hundred ordinary conversations we have examined; however they are quite commonly down- graded. Similarly, second position assess- ments are rarely downgraded but they are quite commonly upgraded. These distribu- tions suggest a recurrent social need to com- pensate for the primary (K+) claims of first position and the secondary (K–) claims of second position.10
10 As noted elsewhere, this analysis is based on an examination of several hundred recorded conversa- tions. Robustly founded quantitative analysis is ham- pered, however, by what Schegloff (1993) calls the “denominator problem.” Briefly put, without clear evidence of the parties’ relative rights to knowledge
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In his essay “Territories of the Self,” Goffman describes an array of territorial “preserves” and ways in which their bound- aries “are ordinarily patrolled and defended by the claimant” (Goffman 1971:52). Goffman did not include a discussion of knowledge and expertise in his description of an “information preserve” (1971:63–64), though control over rights to information is evidently the object of linguistic and interac- tional management (Kamio 1997; Maynard and Zimmerman 1984) and systematic social competition (Abbott 1988). In this paper we have suggested that rights to evaluate states of affairs are indeed “ordinarily patrolled and defended” by individuals in routine con- versational practices through which these rights are ranked by speakers relative to one another.
Our evidence comprises two sorts of observations. First, we have argued that assessing a referent state of affairs in first position implies a claim of primary epistemic and/or moral rights to assess that state. We will abbreviate these as “K+ rights,” relative to those of a second speaker, who has lesser (“K–”) rights. The evidence for this claim is fourfold:
To begin with, first position assessments are rarely upgraded in the several hundred ordinary conversations we have examined; however they are quite commonly down- graded. Similarly, second position assess- ments are rarely downgraded but they are quite commonly upgraded. These distribu- tions suggest a recurrent social need to com- pensate for the primary (K+) claims of first position and the secondary (K–) claims of second position.10
10 As noted elsewhere, this analysis is based on an examination of several hundred recorded conversa- tions. Robustly founded quantitative analysis is ham- pered, however, by what Schegloff (1993) calls the “denominator problem.” Briefly put, without clear evidence of the parties’ relative rights to knowledge
This general distributional observation is
supported by three others:
Downgraded first position assessments are generally produced by persons who, at least at first appearance, have lesser socioepistemic (K–) rights to evaluate them.
In addition, upgraded second position assessments are generally produced by per- sons who, at least at first appearance, have greater socioepistemic (K+) rights to evalu- ate them.
Finally, under conditions where both speakers have putatively equal access to a referent state of affairs, first speakers may downgrade initial assessments using a tag question format, while second speakers respond with declaratives. These two prac- tices cooperate to cancel the epistemic impli- cations of the first and second positioned status of their contributions (see note 7).
This conversational patrol and defense of information preserves is mandated by the fundamental association between the posi- tioning of an assessment and the epistemic claims implied by that positioning. Because social interaction is organized sequentially and because someone must necessarily be first to assess a referent, the management of information preserves is inexorably relevant in social interaction.
Second, we have identified a variety of practices that are deployed in managing these epistemic claims. Downgraded claims in first position are implemented prominent- ly through tag questions and evidentials.11
independent of the talk, we cannot evaluate the extent to which parties assert these rights in the talk. Thus we are obliged to focus on those cases in which the asser- tion of these rights emerges as a matter that the par- ties are addressing by talking. These methodological issues, of course, bracket the question of whether, or how, these relative rights exist independent of their assertion in the situation itself.
11 These do not exhaust speakers’ methods for downgrading the rights claimed by first position assessments. In addition to evidentials and tag ques- tions (which focus on the authoritativeness of the assessment, or on the access claimed by it), speakers also can modulate the rights claimed by a first posi- tion assessment by downgrading its “firstness.” For example, speakers can preface their turns with “so” or other expressions which indicate that the turn is being offered as an upshot or other product of prior talk, and by that action can acknowledge their recip- ients’ primary rights. For example, in the following excerpt, Shirley offers a “so”-prefaced upshot (in
Downgraded first position assessments are generally produced by persons who, at least at first appearance, have lesser socioepistemic (K–) rights to evaluate them.
In addition, upgraded second position assessments are generally produced by per- sons who, at least at first appearance, have greater socioepistemic (K+) rights to evalu- ate them.
Finally, under conditions where both speakers have putatively equal access to a referent state of affairs, first speakers may downgrade initial assessments using a tag question format, while second speakers respond with declaratives. These two prac- tices cooperate to cancel the epistemic impli- cations of the first and second positioned status of their contributions (see note 7).
This conversational patrol and defense of information preserves is mandated by the fundamental association between the posi- tioning of an assessment and the epistemic claims implied by that positioning. Because social interaction is organized sequentially and because someone must necessarily be first to assess a referent, the management of information preserves is inexorably relevant in social interaction.
Second, we have identified a variety of practices that are deployed in managing these epistemic claims. Downgraded claims in first position are implemented prominent- ly through tag questions and evidentials.11
independent of the talk, we cannot evaluate the extent to which parties assert these rights in the talk. Thus we are obliged to focus on those cases in which the asser- tion of these rights emerges as a matter that the par- ties are addressing by talking. These methodological issues, of course, bracket the question of whether, or how, these relative rights exist independent of their assertion in the situation itself.
11 These do not exhaust speakers’ methods for downgrading the rights claimed by first position assessments. In addition to evidentials and tag ques- tions (which focus on the authoritativeness of the assessment, or on the access claimed by it), speakers also can modulate the rights claimed by a first posi- tion assessment by downgrading its “firstness.” For example, speakers can preface their turns with “so” or other expressions which indicate that the turn is being offered as an upshot or other product of prior talk, and by that action can acknowledge their recip- ients’ primary rights. For example, in the following excerpt, Shirley offers a “so”-prefaced upshot (in
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EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY AND SUBORDINATION 35
Upgraded claims in second position are
implemented through an array of practices
that either invoke a “settled” and preexisting
point of view, or deploy interrogative syntax
to compete for first position by usurping a
previous evaluation with a new “first posi-
tioned” evaluation to which the other should
respond. The practices we have identified
here are somewhat varied in their privileges
of occurrence. The [confirmation + agree-
ment] response format is enabled by and vir-
tually specialized to address, and
complement, first assessments that deploy
the [statement + tag] format. Although “oh”-
prefacing is not tied to a specific first position
format, and thus is usable in less complemen-
line 43) to display her understanding of Gerri”s telling about Dana. By virtue of the very way in which this sequence is initiated (e.g., Shirley’s “Did you talk to Dana this week” and “how is he” (line
line 43) to display her understanding of Gerri”s telling about Dana. By virtue of the very way in which this sequence is initiated (e.g., Shirley’s “Did you talk to Dana this week” and “how is he” (line
tary and more competitive ways, it is
deployed almost exclusively in second posi-
tion. Negative interrogatives are most aggres-
sive and can be deployed in either first or
second position to assert claims of epistemic
supremacy. Some of these practices also have
positional and relational variations. For
example, the [statement + tag] format, which
downgrades claims in first position, can be
used by K+ speakers to upgrade a responsive
assessment in second position.
Agreement involves more than simply arriving at aligned evaluations. As our analy- sis makes clear, persons evidently are con- cerned to establish the independence of the positions that are asserted in accomplishing
7)), Shirley conveys her understanding that Gerri has superior knowledge about Dana. This stance is confirmed further by the telling that Gerri goes on to produce.
Agreement involves more than simply arriving at aligned evaluations. As our analy- sis makes clear, persons evidently are con- cerned to establish the independence of the positions that are asserted in accomplishing
7)), Shirley conveys her understanding that Gerri has superior knowledge about Dana. This stance is confirmed further by the telling that Gerri goes on to produce.
[Frankel TCI]
-
7 Shi:
-
8 Ger:
25 Ger:
26
27
28 Shi:
29 Ger:
30 Shi:
31 Ger:
32
.hh Uhm how is he.
(Well) he’s fi:ne[(yeh),
[ss-
Yihknow he’s no:w (.) in (0.2) competition, .hhh=
((14 lines of transcript omitted))
.hh A:nd u- (0.2) yihknow I don’t- he doesn’t think he’s
going to win.c’z there’s a lot’v other students thet, .hh
are doing equally well.=
=M-[hm,]
[or ]and or better.
M-hm,
Bu:t, he does feel tha:t (1.0) yihknow, (.) he’s proud a’
the fact thet he got intuh th’finals. .hhh en he doesn’t
ca:re if he doesn’t make the finals en go o:n .hh=
=Ri[:ght.]
(.)
become a Harvard attorney I mean ‘e doesn’t care
about*that. et[all.
33
34 Shi:
35 Ger:
36 Shi:
37
38 Ger:
39
40 Shi:
41 Shi:
42 Ger:
43 Shi: -> .hh So he’s doing alright.
44 Ger: Ye:ah.
[to- ]Berkeley er wherever, .h[h en then-
[Ri:ght.
Ri[ght.
[So
[Right.
After Gerri’s telling regarding Dana’s participa-
tion in an academic competition, Shirley conveys
her understanding of its upshot by producing an
assessment: “he’s doing alright” (line 43). Although
Shirley produces her assessment of Dana before
Gerri has offered any similar evaluation, she clear-
ly indicates its derivative status, and Gerri’s prima-
ry knowledge in the matter, by prefacing it with a
“so.” Thus instead of modulating the access claimed
by her assessment, she downgrades its “first-
ness”—much as speakers have used interrogative
forms in second position assessments to counter the
default assumptions attached to that position
(Raymond 2004).
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36 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
agreement. This is reflected most prominent-
ly in two themes in our data. First, persons
work to establish the independence of their
access to evaluated states of affairs as a basis
for agreement. Second, persons recurrently
negotiate the relevance of “confirmation”
rather than “agreement” in circumstances
where primary access to a state of affairs
comes to assume critical importance. In these
and other ways, the matter of “who agrees
with whom” turns out to be a common, if not
ubiquitous, feature of the terms of agree-
ment.
These considerations suggest a systemat- ic dilemma at the heart of agreement sequences. Put bluntly, affiliation and agree- ment generally are sought from others; when provided, however, they must respect the parties’ information territories and their associated epistemic rights. Although this problem may be soluble in the matter of “Burmese cats” by responding to someone who asserts the merits of his own cat in terms of the merits of the breed in general, such a solution involves an unavoidable element of detachment from the concrete specifics of the other’s experience. Perhaps this is acceptable in the matter of cats, but a mother’s claim to lack loving feelings for her child cannot be met effectively by remarks about “women in general” (Heritage and Lindström 1998). For this reason, Alcoholics Anonymous specifi- cally encourages members to seek out per- sons with a history of recovering from alcoholism to discuss their problems (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001). In respond- ing to assessments of distinctively personal matters, speakers must manage the indepen- dence of their access to the matters under discussion while avoiding too deep an inter- vention into territories of knowledge, feeling, and relational ownership that their recipients may defend as their own. In such cases, the sociological dilemma of involvement and detachment is an entirely practical matter.
Our analysis of these practices suggests a further observation regarding “face” and related subjects. As we noted in introducing this concept, Goffman and others distinguish betweenfaceandidentity.Aswehaveshown, considerations of face are clearly implicated in the kind of epistemic negotiations with which we have been concerned here. Yet as
These considerations suggest a systemat- ic dilemma at the heart of agreement sequences. Put bluntly, affiliation and agree- ment generally are sought from others; when provided, however, they must respect the parties’ information territories and their associated epistemic rights. Although this problem may be soluble in the matter of “Burmese cats” by responding to someone who asserts the merits of his own cat in terms of the merits of the breed in general, such a solution involves an unavoidable element of detachment from the concrete specifics of the other’s experience. Perhaps this is acceptable in the matter of cats, but a mother’s claim to lack loving feelings for her child cannot be met effectively by remarks about “women in general” (Heritage and Lindström 1998). For this reason, Alcoholics Anonymous specifi- cally encourages members to seek out per- sons with a history of recovering from alcoholism to discuss their problems (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001). In respond- ing to assessments of distinctively personal matters, speakers must manage the indepen- dence of their access to the matters under discussion while avoiding too deep an inter- vention into territories of knowledge, feeling, and relational ownership that their recipients may defend as their own. In such cases, the sociological dilemma of involvement and detachment is an entirely practical matter.
Our analysis of these practices suggests a further observation regarding “face” and related subjects. As we noted in introducing this concept, Goffman and others distinguish betweenfaceandidentity.Aswehaveshown, considerations of face are clearly implicated in the kind of epistemic negotiations with which we have been concerned here. Yet as
Goffman also made clear, face claims com-
monly invoke elements of enduring social
identity. Although multiple identities may be
engaged in the sequences we have discussed
(and in others like them), dog and cat owners
evidently expect to be treated as experts on
their pets. Grandparents have ownership
rights and expect to have the last word in
evaluating their grandchildren. And all par-
ticipants, as Sacks (1984) and Goffman
(1983) observed, have primary rights to know
and describe their own thoughts and experi-
ences.
Persons deploy these practices with remarkable frequency in the context of con- versational agreement. One might think that interactants’ insistence on the assertion of relative epistemic rights is an ugly contami- nant of courses of action which otherwise are the essence of consensus building. One also might think that in this paper we make much ado about nothing: the negotiations and con- flicts that we observe are simply made salient, as Labov and Fanshel (1977:346) noted, as a product of looking closely at activ- ities which probably were not experienced consciously, much less recollected by the par- ties at this level of detail.12 Yet one also may observe that relative epistemic rights to describe and evaluate objects within differ- ent knowledge domains are part of our basic human rights to experience and its expres- sion. The regulation and sanctioning of such rights is no trivial matter, but is rather a part of the interactional “housekeeping” that is a condition of personhood and even sanity (Goffman 1983). That the means by which this housekeeping is managed are lost in a Leibnitzian “surf” is, in this context, all to the good.
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Persons deploy these practices with remarkable frequency in the context of con- versational agreement. One might think that interactants’ insistence on the assertion of relative epistemic rights is an ugly contami- nant of courses of action which otherwise are the essence of consensus building. One also might think that in this paper we make much ado about nothing: the negotiations and con- flicts that we observe are simply made salient, as Labov and Fanshel (1977:346) noted, as a product of looking closely at activ- ities which probably were not experienced consciously, much less recollected by the par- ties at this level of detail.12 Yet one also may observe that relative epistemic rights to describe and evaluate objects within differ- ent knowledge domains are part of our basic human rights to experience and its expres- sion. The regulation and sanctioning of such rights is no trivial matter, but is rather a part of the interactional “housekeeping” that is a condition of personhood and even sanity (Goffman 1983). That the means by which this housekeeping is managed are lost in a Leibnitzian “surf” is, in this context, all to the good.
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———. 2003. “Grammar and Social Organization: Yes/No Type Interrogatives and the Structure of Responding.” American Sociological Review, 68:939–67.
———. 2004. “Prompting Action: The Stand- Alone “So” in Ordinary Conversation.” Research on Language and Social Interaction, 37:185–218.
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———. 1987. “On the Preferences for Agreement and Contiguity in Sequences in Conversation.” Pp. 54–69 in Talk and Social Organisation, edited by Graham Button and John R. E. Lee. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters.
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Raymond, Geoffrey. 2000. “The Voice of Authority: The Local Accomplishment of Authoritative Discourse in Live News Broadcasts.” Discourse Studies 2:354–79.
———. 2003. “Grammar and Social Organization: Yes/No Type Interrogatives and the Structure of Responding.” American Sociological Review, 68:939–67.
———. 2004. “Prompting Action: The Stand- Alone “So” in Ordinary Conversation.” Research on Language and Social Interaction, 37:185–218.
Roth, Andrew. 2002. “Social Epistemology in Broadcast News Interviews. Language in Society 31:355–81.
Sacks, Harvey. 1984. “On Doing ‘Being Ordinary.’” Pp. 413–29 in Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis, edited by J. Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1987. “On the Preferences for Agreement and Contiguity in Sequences in Conversation.” Pp. 54–69 in Talk and Social Organisation, edited by Graham Button and John R. E. Lee. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters.
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———. 1992. “Repair After Next Turn: The Last Structurally Provided for Place for the Defense of Intersubjectivity in Conversation.” American Journal of Sociology 95:1295–1345.
———. 1993. “Reflections on Quantification in the Study of Conversation.” Research on Language and Social Interaction 26:99–128.
———. 1996a. “Confirming Allusions: Toward an Empirical Account of Action.” American Journal of Sociology 104:161–216.
———. 1996b. “Turn Organization: One Intersection of Grammar and Interaction.” Pp. 52–133 in Interaction and Grammar, edit- ed by Elinor Ochs, Sandra Thompson and Emanuel Schegloff. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1996c. “Some Practices for Referring to Persons in Talk-in-Interaction: A Partial Sketch of a Systematics.” Pp. 437–85 in Studies in Anaphora, edited by Barbara Fox. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
———. Forthcoming. A Primer of Conversation Analysis: Sequence Organization. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Schegloff, Emanuel A., Gail Jefferson, and Harvey Sacks. 1977. “The Preference for Self- Correction in the Organization of Repair in Conversation.” Language 53:361–82.
Stivers, Tanya. Forthcoming. “Modified Repeats and Claiming Authority from Second Position.” Research on Language and Social Interaction.
Whalen, Marilyn and Don Zimmerman. 1990. “Describing Trouble: Practical Epistemology in Citizen Calls to the Police.” Language in Society 19:465–92.
———. 1992. “Repair After Next Turn: The Last Structurally Provided for Place for the Defense of Intersubjectivity in Conversation.” American Journal of Sociology 95:1295–1345.
———. 1993. “Reflections on Quantification in the Study of Conversation.” Research on Language and Social Interaction 26:99–128.
———. 1996a. “Confirming Allusions: Toward an Empirical Account of Action.” American Journal of Sociology 104:161–216.
———. 1996b. “Turn Organization: One Intersection of Grammar and Interaction.” Pp. 52–133 in Interaction and Grammar, edit- ed by Elinor Ochs, Sandra Thompson and Emanuel Schegloff. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1996c. “Some Practices for Referring to Persons in Talk-in-Interaction: A Partial Sketch of a Systematics.” Pp. 437–85 in Studies in Anaphora, edited by Barbara Fox. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
———. Forthcoming. A Primer of Conversation Analysis: Sequence Organization. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Schegloff, Emanuel A., Gail Jefferson, and Harvey Sacks. 1977. “The Preference for Self- Correction in the Organization of Repair in Conversation.” Language 53:361–82.
Stivers, Tanya. Forthcoming. “Modified Repeats and Claiming Authority from Second Position.” Research on Language and Social Interaction.
Whalen, Marilyn and Don Zimmerman. 1990. “Describing Trouble: Practical Epistemology in Citizen Calls to the Police.” Language in Society 19:465–92.
John Heritage is professor of sociology, at UCLA. His research addresses topics in conversa-
tion analysis including applications to a variety of institutional settings. He is currently working
on a range of aspects of doctor-patient interaction, and on presidential press conferences (with
Steven Clayman).
Geoffrey Raymond is assistant professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His research interests include the study of talk-in-interaction, the role of talk in the organization of institutions, and qualitative research methods. Recent publications on these issues have appeared in American Sociological Review, Discourse Studies and Research on Language and Social Interaction. He is currently co-editing a book, with Darin Weinberg and Paul Drew, on the role of talk in sociological research.
Geoffrey Raymond is assistant professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His research interests include the study of talk-in-interaction, the role of talk in the organization of institutions, and qualitative research methods. Recent publications on these issues have appeared in American Sociological Review, Discourse Studies and Research on Language and Social Interaction. He is currently co-editing a book, with Darin Weinberg and Paul Drew, on the role of talk in sociological research.
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